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Free-Release Source Strength Equation 13
Relation Abstract. A study has been made of the possible hazard outside an enclosure which could be caused by uncontrolled oxidation of plutonium within the enclosure. The report first reviews the existent observational data on such restricted plutonium release and then constructs a release model relating the free-release source strength (i.e., the source strength outside the enclosure) and the parameters describing the release.
Based on both the observational data and the model calculations, the conclusion follows that restricted release is unlikely to lead to dangerous free releases of a plutonium aerosol. The model calculations specifically show that the maximum credible accident assumed would be safe by about 2 1 / 2 orders of magnitude. However, the calculations indicate that maximizing either the plutonium release rate or the asymptotic temperature reached in an enclosure can cause a free release exceeding the safe rate.
INTRODUCTION
Included in the report are some new calculational results and modifications of some of the original calculational data published by the writer in an earlier Rocky Flats Plant Report. The earlier version, entitled The Restricted Release of Plutonium was issued as RFP-799 in October 17, 1966. In the current report, a more realistic assessment is also made of the gas heating by plutonium oxidation within an enclosure and also of the possibility of particle entrainment by the gas leaking from the enclosure.
The report refers to st.udies of the restricted release of plutonium; that is, release from within an enclosure in which plutonium is handled. The purpose of the study was to determine the possible hazard outside an enclosure which could result from uncontrolled oxidation of plutonium within the enclosure ·under several sets of release conditions. The questions of any economic loss caused by such releases or the mechanism of plutonium uptake and deposition in the body were not part of the studies. Thus, no plutonium deposition on surfaces outside the enclosure was considered. . The 40-hour per week continuous exposure airborne concentration limits were used as reference values .. The limits were taken from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) instructions in Manual Chapter 0524, Standards for Plutonium Radiation, February 17, 1964 . Limits for plutonium-239 are shown in Table I . (See Appendix C, Page 37 for the procedure followed in specifying a limiting source strength from the limits given in Table I .)
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The model is used to evaluate the leakage limits of the critical mass assembly cell of the Rocky Flats Plant Nuclear Safety Facility. The procedure first assumes a maximum credible plutonium-handling accident (specified by a set of nominal release variables) within the test cell. The resultant free-release source strength is then found based on the permissible test-cell leakage rate at a certain overpressure. The free-release source strength is then compared with an always safe, free-release source strength obtained from existent atmospheric dispersion models f e.g., Gifford ( 1) l 1 and the Atomic Energy Commission plutonium airborne concentration limits (see Appendix C, Page 37).
Ranges are also assigned to the release variables to determine the sensitivity of the computed free-release source strength to the model parameters. The results are given in the calculations section. The most sensitive variables are found to be the plutonium release rate and the enclosure thermal equilibrium type.
OBSERVATIONAL DATA ON RESTRICTED PLUTONIUM RELEASE
The data available on restricted plutonium release are of two types: first, observations are available on plutonium release associated with the accident experience of several plutonium-handling facilities; and second, several experiments have been performed on the release, or the simulated release, of plutonium.
Observations of Accidental Release:
OXIDATION OF METALLIC PLUTONIUM -The observations of plutonium release associated with accidents at the Rocky Flats Plant of the Dow Chemical Company in Golden, Colorado has been discussed by Tuck and Hunt (2) .
In one incident {September 1957), approximately 22 kilograms (kg) of plutonium spontaneously ignited in a glove box. The glove-box walls burned and th~ fire also destroyed all filters between the box and the building-exhaust stack, while the exhaust fans were running at high speed in an attempt to remove smoke from the room. Even though the entire mass of plutonium was oxidized, environmental air and vegetation sampling showed increases in activity which were well below hazardous levels.
In another incident, an 800-gram plutonium briquette spontaneously ignited while being weighed in a glove box. A dry-box glove was removed to help extinguish the fire, [King (3) ] . About 150 grams of plutonium (probably the entire evaporator contents) were dispersed to the cell and auoul 0.6 grams wtm: blown out the cell door. Buildings and nearby streets were contaminated. The operating area of the building was contaminated also by the air flow tlu-ough open pipes and otlu:r t:ell-wall penetrations. About 1.5 grams of plutonium were removed in the cell ventilation-filter plenum, but no measurable amount of plutonium was released via this system to the plant stack.
DISPERSION OF PLUTONIUM FROM A LATHE-BOX FIRE -On October 15, 1965, a fire occurred at Rocky Flat.s Plant in a lathe dry-box drain line containing oily plutonium chips and turnings. The fire involved 20 to 30 grams of plutonium and ot:curred when sparking from mechanical abrasion resulted during an attempt to clear the clogged oil-drain line. The spread of plutonium from the fire caused airborne concentrations to exceed the 8-hour radioactivity concentration guide throughout most of the building. The prevailing spread was along established building ventilation air-flow patterns and, as far as 190 feet from the fire, the air activity was greater than 100 percent of the 8-hour concentration limit. No measurable activity occurred beyond the buildings even through some penetration of the absolute filters in the main building filter plenum occurred. The analysis of the filter paper from the air-sample heads {located between 15 and 50 feet from the fire) indicated the.airborne particles were mostly plutonium dioxide (Pu0 2 ), even though oils and carbon tetrachloride (recently used to clean the drain line) were present at the site of the fire. The great spread of the particles was probably caused largely from the fme state of division of the metal involved in the release, but may also be associated with the catalyzing action of the oil and the carbon tetrachloride (CC4 ).
The greater dispersion of plutonium associated with the solution and hydrocarbon incidents indicates that smaller particles more easily transported were involved than those in the metallic burning cases. These particles were probably oxides but could also be either hydrides, carbides, nitrides, or compounds (such as chlorides) associated with process solvents. In the Rocky Flats lathe-box fire, for instance, the measured particle mass-mean diameter was 0.32 microns. This is a factor about 10 3 smaller ·in diameter than the measured Pu0 2 particles formed from burning plutonium [Stewart (4) ).
Experiments on Restricted Release:
GRAVEL GERTIE EXPERIMENTS -In order to measure contaminati.on caused by explosions involving fissile material, the AEC designed a special test structure known as Gravel Gertie. The distinctive feature of Gravel Gertie was a 15-foot gravel covering, used instead of a solid roof and which was supported by steel cables and steel mesh. In the event of a detonation within the structure involving fissile material, the roof was expected to rise, absorbing some of the explosive shock and filtering the nuclear material from the escaping gas. A schematic of the structure is shown in Figure 1 . The primary interest of the Gravel Gertie tests was to determine if containment could be achieved in an explosion involving plutonium. However, the difficulties and expense involved in a plutonium shot precluded its use, so that uranium was finally substituted as a tracer material. The substitution was justified by the data obtained in a prior shot conducted in the open involving both uranium and plutonium in which the deposition data for the two elements compared favorably [Cowen (5) ] . In the final Gravel Gertie test, conducted in April 1957, the entrance to the structure was sealed and a charge of uranium was detonated with 550 pounds of high explosive. The gravel roof of the structure was observed to raise a maximum amount of 22 feet and did not settle back into place for about 3 seconds. As a result of previous explosions in the structure, many cracks and missile craters existed in the walls and large cracks were found in the two 10-foot cubical bays (see Figure I) . Also, the ceiling cables failed under the dynamic load of the falling rock, filling the roo.m with gravel. The results of the test showed that no measurable amount of uranium was dispersed outside of Gravel Gertie, even under these extreme conditions. EXPLODING WIRE EXPERIMENTS -Cheever (6) has performed a set of experiments which involved volatilizing 1-or 2-gram amounts of plutonium in the form of a slab, cylinder, or small turning. The ignition in air was done in a plutonium system glove box which was exhausted at a rate of 5 feet per minute through a series of 3 to 7 high efficiency filters. The results of the tests were that an average of 0.00055 percent of the plutonium burned was collected on the filters and that an average penetration of the first filter of 0.5 percent occurred. The average particle size of the plutonium oxide aerosol was found by electron microscope studies to be 0.016 microns.
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The conclusions to be drawn from the experiments and accident experience involving plutonium release are that restricted release of plutonium is not likely to be significant. Even in the case of the ORNL accident, when 150 grams of a probable finely divided aerosol of plutonium were dispersed explosively into a cell, only 0.6 grams escaped through the open cell door and the spread of plutonium contamination outside the cell was minor.
THEORY OF RESTRICTED RELEASE Probable Type of Release:
The released material is assumed to consist of plutonium whose activity level is 0.61 curies per gram. This activity level is representative of the isotopic content usually associated with reactor-grade plutonium (cf., 0.061 curies per gram for 239 Pu). The most likely compound present in an accidental plutonium release is plutonium dioxide (Pu0 2 ). This results from the plentiful supply of oxygen which would usually be associated with a substantial plutonium release and to the relatively large reaction heat for dioxide formation (252 kilocalories per mole) which energetically favors Pu0 2 as a reaction product. Large releases of other plutonium compounds would occur only under special release circumstances, such as a chemical explosion in a system where plutonium metal is immersed in a nonoxygen containing organic liquid. Also, any volatilization of plutonium or Pu0 2 would not contribute significantly to the · airborne hazard [Hilliard (7) ] .
With regard to hazards calculations, it is not particularly important which plutonium compounds are involved in a release. Any dependence of free-release source strength on the compound type may be accounted for by the ranges of particle-size distributions and release rates which are assumed. Thus to be definitive, all releases are assumed to consist entirely of Pu0 2 particles of density 11.46 grams per cubic centimeter.
Even though the Gravel Gertie experiments were quoted to emphasize the small probability of restricted release under extreme release conditions, note that the model does not assume any initial impulse overpressure associated with the release. The reason relates to the purpose of the report which is not to assess the ability of an enclosure to withstand an explosion, but to evaluate an enclosure leakage rate specified at a certain overpressure. Thus, the plutonium release itself must not be allowed to change the enclosure leakage rate, other than through a change fo the static overpressure · associated with the release. Several determinations of size and mass distributions 9f Pu0 2 particles released from plutonium metal have been made by Stewart ( 4.), Andersen (8) , and Kirchner (9) . These distributions vary widely depending on the crystalline phase of the metal; the oxidation temperature; the hµmidity, temperature, motion, and composition of the ambient gas; the surface-to-mass ratio of the metal; and (unfortunately) on the method of measurement used. Any special oxidation circumstances, such as oxidation from solution, will also strongly affect particle distributions. In order to easily use measurements of particle size and mass, the particles are a~signed an equivalent spherical diameter. Such an assignment then uniquely specifies the relation between the mass and size distributions. Depending on the method of measurement, this assignment will give a particle distribution which somewhat overemphasizes inertial processes and underestimates diffusive transport and thermophoresis or vice versa. Thus, for any reasonably polydisperse particle distribution, the use of the equivalent diam~ter concept should not lead to serious error. For theoretical calculations, having an analytical expression for the particle distribution is necessary. The distributions represented by Equation 1 should be modified when particle distributions in the enclosure leak paths are required. This modification is done by multiplying Equation 1 and the integrand of Equation·2 by Kon, where K is a constant and n is determined by the principal particle ·mode of transport to the enclosure walls.
The values of n are 2 for particle settling, -1.5 for diffusion, and 0 for convective transfer. The conservative assumption is made that the nominal value of n is 2 (diffusive transport) so that the smaller oxide particles are assumed to reach leak paths more readily. This will shift the log normal distributions present in the enclosure to a distribution in the leak paths characterized by a predominance of smaller particles which are less likely to be deposited in the leak paths. The formation rate is computed by assuming that the total mass, Mt, of plutonium is divided into submasses which each have a mass, M 1 , and a surface area, A 1 . During the release, M 1 and A 1 are assumed to remain constant at their original value so that the formation rate is given by Equation 4: 
Where Rh is the rate of molecule.s enlering leak paths, and ~ is the rate of molecular deposition on interior enclosure surfaees. The forms of Rh and ~ are assumed to be given by Equations 6 and 7 (see also Appendix A, Page 33):
and
Where Ah is the total leak-path entrance area; At is the total area of enclosure interior surfaces; and f is the fraction of the molecules which strike interior enclosure surfaces and are retained there. Equations 4, 5, and 7 now are combined to give an expression for Rh on the assumption that a steady state has been achieved so that dNP/dt = 0 or:
Only particles that are greater than 10 microns in equivalent diameter are considered airborne. This is consistent with the work done by Mishima (11 ) . He states that more than 99 percent of all Pu0 2 particles, whose equivalent diameter is greater than 10 microns, will in 6.86 minutes settle out of a turbulent room-temperature aerosol _in a 10-foot high chamber. Values of Fa for the particle distributions shown in Figure 2 are given in Table II .
The factor f may be estimated from either of the following relations:
Where K is the resuspension factor, f is the length characterizing the resuspending disturbance (a typical enclosure dimension in the situations considered in this paper), V d is the particle deposition velocity, and Vt is the transport velocity of particles normal to the deposition surface. The definition of K is:
surface contamination (area- 1 ) Thus, K has units of reciprocal length. The latter number gives f = 0.999 if 1 is assumed to be 20 meters (m).
The definition of V d is:
particle deposition rate per unit area particle concentration in gas immediately above surface 
Description of Releases:
RELEASE RATES -The release rates vary over about 10 orders of magnitude depending on the crystalline phase and surface-to-mass ratio of the metal and the humidity, temperature, motion, and composition of the ambient gas.
Stewart ( 4) summarizes the existent data on release rates and, from his compilation, a nominal release-rate value is assumed as: 1 microcurie per square centimeter per hour, or 1.14 X I0 12 plutonium atoms per square centimeter. per second
The associated oxidation rate (Mishima (I I)] is: Leakage from the Enclosure:
The leakage of air from the enclosure is assumed to occur via a number, Ni, of rough circular cross-section tubes of radius ri. The tubes penetrate the walls perpendicularly and are straight except for a number, j, of kinks each consisting of two bends of equal and opposite curvature radii and which have equal bend angles. The two bends which compose a kink are assumed to lie in the same plane and the spatial orientation of the kinks is assumed to be random. The radii of curvature, Re, of the bends is taken to be of the order of the tube radii and given by Equation 9:
In Equation 9, Kc is a constant. The length of the leak paths is not assumed to be increased by the presence of kin:ks and so should be a minimum. ' The leak-path model should thus be conservative. The net airflow out of the room on the basis of the above model (where Vi is the average velocity in a tube of radius ri) is:
""-.,, I I I
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Then v. for laminar flow is given by:
( For transition and turbulent flow: vi= 0 2 7T r u (r) 7T r~ Jn thP. P.cp1ation, rw is the tuhe radius and u (r) is the flow velocity as a function of the distance r from the tube axis. This is a realistic assumption for the short path lengths and low viscosities involved in the flow.
2. No net gravitational work is done during the flow. For a random distribution of tube directions in an enclosure wall, this should be a reasonable assumption.
3. The gas motion is isothermal and incompressible for laminar flow and adiabatic for turbulent flow. Although a good approximation for the laminar flow, for turbulent flow in small tubes {diameter of the order of a millimeter) it may overestimate the velocity by a factor of about two because of turbulent convective heat transfer .
4. An average value off may be defined for the flow. This is a reasonable approximation since this quantity will barely change during the gas flow.· 5. The.decrease of velocity associate? with the leak-path kinks is neglected. Pressure-head losses associated with tube bends are usually small but, for~ path with several kinks at high flow velocities and a high Reynolds number, a significant error can occur. However, since inertial deposition will be neglected in turbulent flow, this should ~ea conservative approximation.
6. The expression is valid for both-subsonic and supersonic flow. The friction factors are no.t well-known for supersonic flow and also stagnation pressure losses (which are not accounted for in Equation 12 ) will start to become significant [Shames ( 13)] , so that Equation 12 be-· comes somewhat inaccurate. It will, however, be shown subsequently that this inaccuracy will not significantly affect theleak-pathdeposition probability. 
The quantity e is a roughness parameter which has the dimensions of length. Values of e for several materials are given by Knudsen and Katz (14) .
The validation of fwith Re in the range2000<Re<3000is not known and so arbitrary models for f must be adopted. RFP-1543 and the laminar-flow recipe to be valid in the region 2000<Re<2500. Equations 11 and 12 were tested by using them to compute the leakage rate from the Rocky . Flats Nuclear Safety test cell when the cell was overpressured to 1.6 pounds per square inch and allowed to leak through a four-foot long, 1/2-inch diameter straight steel pipe. The computed leakage rate was 7 .9 ± 1 .0 X 10 3 cubic centimeters per second (cm 3 /sec) while the observed rate is 8 .21 ± o.2 X 10 3 cm 3 /sec. The error in the computed number results from the uncertainty as to the roughness value to assign to the steel pipe.
The leakage paths are specified by the following parameters:
1. The size distribution of the leakage tubes. The choice of the q is made by utilizing whatever physical knowledge is available to estimate the characteristic leakpath dimensions. It is usually impossible to specify an ri distribution so an average model of q versus enclosure overpressure is assumed in any one leakage calculation. This average model is then varied to account for any lack of conservativeness introduced by this assumption. Nominal variations of ri with pressure and ranges of these variations are specified for the Rocky Flats Plant critical assembly cell in the next section.
The value of Ni is computed from Equations 10, 11, and 12 by using values of Q, Pat• and T 0 , obtained either from measurements of the leakage rate from the enclosure or from a specification of permissible leakage rates. This procedure gives values of Ni which ensures that the leakage model is co"ect at one overpressure. The Ni is assumed independent of pressure [Chi et al ( 15) ] , and is the Ni used in calculations of Q for a particular ri versus enclosure overpressure model.
The leak-path length distribution is also arbitrary and so the conservative assumption is made that the leak-path lengths are all equal to the average enclosure wall thickness.
The limits set up for enclosure leakage rates refer to static overpressure in enclosures with small but numerous. leak paths whose characteristic d1mens1on is a few hundredths of a millimeter. Therefore, in the evaluation of enclosure RFP-1543 leakage rate limits, it is not necessary to consider the effects of large characteristic dimension Jeak paths such as unsealed conduits or open doors. It is, however, interest mg and important from a maximum credible accident standpoint to consider such leak paths. Thus in the next section, the maximum safe diameter of a single open straight pipe will be computed for the nominal release values. The maximum safe number of pipes of any diameter, less than the single pipe safe diameter, may also be readily obtained from the computations.
The specification of the leak-path bends is also arbitrary and so nominal and extremal values are assigned to them. The specification for the Rocky Flats Assembly Room is given in the next section. The gravitational settHng mec~nism is only important for oxide particles of greater than about I or 2 microns in diameter, while the diffusion and conduction mechanisms are significant for particles of less than about 0.1 micron diameter.
The inertial mechanism increases in importance for laminar fldw a!I the flow velocity increases and will usually be the dominant deposition mode for near sonic velocities. Turbulent deposition will usually dominate all other mechanisms for turbulent flow and for particles of less than I or 2 microns diameter. The turbulent deposition mode also increases in importance with increasing velocity. The deposition probabilities for the mechanisms assume that if an aerosol pa.rticle were transported to a conduit wall, it is sure to be retained there. This is the usual assumption made in studies of aerosol transport [Postma (16) Where F g = nondeposition probability for settling 
THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY (THERMOPHORESIS) -
According to Postma (16) , an expression for the change in concentration of particles in a circular tube as a function. of the inlet gas temperature and the tube w_all temperature is:
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Where, Kg = gas thermal conductivity T 0 = inlet absolute gas temperature T w = average wall temperature KP = particle thermal conductivity These assumptions are ordinarily met for the conditions considered in this report when turbulent flow occurs.
INERTIAL IMPACTION -As particles traverse bends in the leak paths, a centrifugal force is developed which causes the particles to move radially outward. The radial motion will be opposed by a ·stokes' Law resistive force given by:
Where, (mu) µ = the gas viscosity 
Where Vt is the tangential velocity of the particle traversing the bend, Re is the average radius of curvature of particles in lhe bend, and mis the particle mass. The radial particle motion in the bend cannot be considered uniform and so the equation for radial motion using Equations 21 and 22 is:
If more than one bend per leak path is assumed, Fb is given as:
In Equation 26, j is the number of bends and Fb,o is the (23) · single bend nondeposition probability. The leak-path bends are hence assumed to act independently of one another with res.pect to particle deposition.
The relation between Vt and Vr is obtained by assuming the total kinetic energy of the particles remains constant as the particles traverse the bend. Also, the flow-velocity profile is assumed to be unaltered as the fluid goes around the bend. Equation 23 may be solved for the radial displacement, Dor, of a particle subject to the boundarv condition V ,.,. O al t = 0 or: indicates:
1. An average bend-curvature radius for the particl.~s.
Tho effect of lhis approximation is estimated in the next section. When Equations 27· and 28 are combined to give a turbulent nondeposition probability, Ft; the limit of Ft as d~0 0 is zero. To avoid this physically impossible situation, the criteria of Friedlander and Johnstone (23) are used. The criteria are that for particles whose rec.luced stopping distance, s+, is greater than 30, the expression for V d/Vi is given as: (29) The reduced stopping distance, which physically is the distance a particle will travel before stopping when a'cted on by only a Stokes' Law type resistance force, is given by:
The criteria ensure that, under most circumstances of interest in this report, supersonic flow velocities will not affect the· deposition probabilities appreciably. For example,· for just sonic, turbulent flow of air in rough tubes whose asymptotic value off is 0.018, Equation 29 will apply for all particles greater than 0.155 microns in diameter. Since Equation 15 shows that at high Reynold (Re) numbers, _(f is independent of the Re number), the applicability of Equation 29 implies deposition probabilities will not be much affected by changes in supersonic flow velocities. Equations 27, 28, 29, and 30 are hence assumed to specify the turbulent deposition probability.
The assumptions include:
4.
Turbulent flow (Re>2500). Constant cross-section circular tubes. All.particles which approach within one stopping distance of the tube wall are removed from the flow. The initial velocity used in calculating the stopping distance is the root mean square (rms) velocity of turbulent fluctuations in the direction normal to the wall.
Total Deposition Probability:
The net probability for the nonoccurrence of an event when several independent and simultaneous ways exist for the event to occur is the product of the several independent nonoccurrence probabilities. The assumption follows that all the nondeposition mechanisms arc independent. Thus, the expression used to compute the tolctl deposition probability, F, is: RFP-1543 The exponent y is equal to r1 + 2, with the value of n for the different modes of particle transport to the enclosure walls giv~n e~rlier in this se.ction.
The F i,j represents the average nondeposition probability for tubes of radius ri and containingj bends per leak path. The Rhi,j is the rate of incidence of particles on leak paths of type (i, j) as given by Equation 8 with Ah = Ah i,j being the total entrance area of (i, j) type leak paths. The integration limits in Equation 35 are 10-3 and I 0 microns, according to the previous discussion of particle size distribution. 
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A computer program (code name DISPER) to compute S for different leak-path and release models has been written in F.ORTRAN IV for the CDC 3800. A typical problem running time is five seconds. In Figure 3 , a flow diagram of the program is given.
Relation Between Source Strength and Airborne Particle Concentration:
A conservative estimate of the conversion of free release source strength, S, to maximum airborne concentration, X (chi), is obtained from the work of Gifford (I). The following assumptions are made:
1. Point-Source Release Occurs with Volume-Source Dilution:
This means that the cross-sectional area of a point-source plume normal to the wind direction is increased by a factor proportional to the source area normal to the wind direction. The normal-source area, An, is assumed to be the minimum vertical cross-section area which includes the vertical symmetry axis of the enclosure. The porportionality constant is conservatively taken as 0.5 [Gifford (l)]. The point-source concentration, (chi) X 0 , is thus divided by a factor (I + 0.5Anfrrayaz) where (ay) 2 and (az) 2 are the horizontal and vertical dispersion coefficients, respectively.
Groum;l Level Release Occurs:
This assumption may be shown to o.verestimate the actual maximum concentration by a factor of about 500 for releases from a height above the ground equal to half the test-cell height.
No Particle Sinks are Present:
This means that no surface deposition or washout of particles is assumed. This assumption is fairly realistic and should not overestimate the actual maximum concentration by more than 10 to 20 percent.
Moderately Stable Type-F Atmospheric
Conditions Exist:
The probability here is roughly 0.15 for such conditions to exist at the Rocky Flats Plant site. The wind velocity, u , associated with such conditions is about 2 meters per second•. This-assumption minimizes the spread of the plume and can overestimate X by as much as a factor of 40 (see Figure 4 ).
The Concentration is Measured on the Plume Axis:
The probability of a person being just downwind from the facility when a release occurs is slight, but this assumption is necessary to obtain an. estimate of the maximum possible concentration associated with a release. 
APPLICATION OF RESTRICTED RELEASE THEORY
The Rocky Flats Plant Critical Assembly Test Cell:
The theory outlined in the previous section is now used to evaluate the leakage-rate limits of the Rocky Fla ts Plant Critical Mass Facility test cell (2). The leakage-rate limits specified for this test cell are less than 3.0 percent total volume leakage in 6 hours and no greater than 0.5 percent total volume lt:akage in any I hour at an overpressure of 1.6 psi. The Rocky Flats Plant cell has been leak-tested and found to conform to these limits, Physically, the test cell is a rectangular parallelepiped with concrete walls, roof, and floor. The cell interior is 35 feet long, 32 feet wide, and 32 feet high. The north wall, which is between the experiment and the experimenters, On these assumptions, the relation b.etw9cn the cell temperature, T 0 (°K), and the mass of plutonium oxidized, Mt (moles), is:
In the equation, TCON is a constant specifying the type of thermal equilibrium assumed. Values TCON for several types of equilibrium are shown in Table Ill The relation between cell temperature and cell pressure is ·given by the perfect gas law or:
Where, L =the fractional leakage= a~ 0 , where · at nat and n 0 are the number densities of air outside and inside the enclosure, respectively.
P At= the atmospheric.pressure.
In order to relate the test-cell overpressure to the amount of plutonium oxidized, the following procedure is used. If TCON has its maximum value, corresponding to a rapid release of heat, then L:::::: 0 implying: · the width and spacing of flexural cracks in reinforced concrete. The differences in rebar pattern, size, heat generated in cement setting, and surface treatment of the test specimens of Chi and Kirstein (IS) and the blocks of which the test cell is constructed, make this only an order of magnitude model. Applied also is the assumption that the leak paths have the surface dimension through their entire penetration of the concrete. These bases are suitable, however, as a starting point for studying the effect of leak-path size variation on t~e source· strength. The dependence of ri on external pressure is derived in two steps: First, the following expression is written (where ri = r since all leak paths are assumed to have the same radius, and where a is the stress in a rebar):
The The nominal value of one ninety-degree bend should be a conservative estimate for obtaining the inertial deposition properties of any possible leak path in the test cell. The maximum values in Table V more nearly approach the physical situation being simulated here.
THE LEAK-PATH ROUGHNESS -The primary compo· s1tion of leak-path walls is assumed to be concrete and the range of roughness values is 0.0305 to 0.305 centimeters (cm) [Knudsen et al. (14) ). Secondary leak paths may be through metal pipes (e "'=' 0.0045 cm) or around rubber gaskets (e "'=' 0.01 cm). The nominal e value and range of e values are shown in Table VJ. 18 Figures S and 6 show the variation of the free release source strength with, respectively, particle-size distribution and mode of particle transport-to-enclosure walls. In Figure 5 , the mass-mean diameter (dm) of the assumed particle distribution is plotted versus source strengths for three values of geometric standard deviation (ag) and three plutonium masses. For the nominal situation 0f 300 k ilogra rns (kg) of oxtd !zed plutonium, dm :::;; 2µ and ag = 2, it is seen that varying a can increase S by · about a factor of 15 (2 X 10 1 u to f X 10 11 ), while varying dm can increase S by a factor of 37 (2 X 10 10 to 7.4 X 10 11 ).
Other "hservf!tiom; from Figure 5 are:
a. For a small particle distribution, the effect of particle dispersion variation is negligible. This is caused by the relative insensitivity of lhe nondeposition probability of small particles to changes in particle size. b .. For·sufficiently large and sufficiently mono-disperse ·particle distributions, almost no particles escape the test cell. Thus, the dm == 4 microns, ag = 1.5 di~fribution leadn to nourly perfect containment of the aerosolized plutonium (S = 3 .3 X I 0-4 plutonium atoms per second). c. Source strengths associated with laminar-flow leakage from the enclosure, which occur when 300 kg of plutonium is oxidized, are Jess affected by partic!e"distribution variation than are the turbulent flow leakage-source strengths which accompany the 500-kg oxidation. 
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The dependence of source strength.on the mode of particle transport to interior enclosure surfaces is shown in Figure 6 , . where the source strength is plotted versus the exponent y of Equation 35, Page 13. As previously mentioned, y = 1 /2 refers to diffusive transport, y = 2 to convectfon, and y = 4 to pure settling. Intermediate values of y refer to mixtures of these transport mechanisms. The curves of Figure 6 are parametric in lhe mass of plutonium oxidized. Figure 6 shows that the nominal assumption of y = 1/2 may overestimate the source strength by over four orders of magnitude (4.8 X 10 6 to 4 X 10 2 ). Note from Figure 6 that the assumption, y = 1/2, is always conservative.
2. Fixed Number and Size of Leak Paths. Figures 7 and 8 respectively show the source-strength variation with the thermal equilibrium type assumed in the enclosure and with the mass of oxidized metal. The variation of source strength with TCON can be significant since an increase in TCON increases the flow velocity, both through an increase in leak-path radius and an increase in the pressure; and also increases Rh (Equation 8) through the increase in leak-path radius. In Figure 7 , values of TCON (See Table III ) are plotted versus source strength for several different masses of plutonium oxidized. For the nominal mass of 300 kg, the source slrenglh may increase to 7.2 X 10 14 plutonium atoms per second for the maximum TCON considered. The maximum TCON is the value for thermal equilibrium with air alone, which would require a release rate of about 10 5 microcuries per square centimeter per hour, and would yield a coarse particle distribution [Stewart ( 4) ] . Such an extreme type of release would represent the simulation by the model of explosive dispersion (see Appendix B, Page 35).
The effect on the source strength of the mass oxidized for the nominal release conditions and leak-path models is shown in Figure 8 . The minimum mass oxidized of IO kg is shown to he perfectly contained by the enclosure while the nominal mass leads to a 2 .64 X 10 11 source strength. The maximum mass of 1000 kg is shown to give rise to a source strength of 1.11 X 10 12 atoms per second or about an order of magnitude greater than the nominal value. The structure of the curve in Figure 8 is explainable as follows.
For small masses(~ 30 kg), the flow velocity is slow enough that diffusion and settling remove all the aerosol particles in the leak paths. As the mass increases, the flow velocity increases so that settling and diffusion become less effective, but inertial impaction increases in importance. Thus, between 30 and 300 kg, the source strength at first increases rapidly and then more slowly. Between 340 and 400 kg, the transition from laminar to turbulent flow occurs.
Above 400 kg, turbulent deposition and thermal conduction are assumed to be the only deposition mechanisms in the RFP-1543 · leak paths so that an initial and physically unreal rise occurs. Above 700 kg, turbulent deposition starts to become effective and a decrease in source strength occurs up to about 1200 kg. Above this, the increase in enclosure overpressure and leak-path radius causes Equation 29 (Page 13} for V d/Vi to become applicable for the bulk of the particles involved in the release. The turbulent nondeposition probability then begins to tend to unity with an associated rise in source strength (S). The trends outlined above appear in all of the graphs involving a variation of S with a parameter which increases the flow velocity (see Figures 7, 9 , and 12).
The release is also specified by the values assumed for the plutonium release rate and area-to-mass ratio. The effect of varying the leak-path size for otherwise nominal leak-path specifications and nominal release conditions is shown in Figure 9 . The nominal value and ranges of values forr, as specified by a and bin Equation 41 (see Table IV ), are shown in Figure 9 -: It is seen that varying the leak-path size may increase S by about an orderofmagmtude(4.6X 10 11 lu2. 7X 10 12 ) . The number of leak paths associated with T also appear in Figure 9 . For the nominal radius of 6.2 X 10-2 cm, the number is 133, while for the minimum radius of 2.5 X 10-2 cm, the number is 5234. The latter number is more physically representative of the number of leak paths which actually exist while the nominal radius selected represents the physical dimensions expected of the leak paths. The smaller numbers of leak paths actually computed for the nominal radius represent the attempt of the model to account for the constriction of the leak-path entrances because of the several surface treatments received by the interior and exterior surfaces of the test cell The model thus neglects any particle deposition or flow-velocity reduction which is associated with the entrance constriction, but underestimates the number of possible leak paths for the particles. 2. The S decreases as the bend radius of curvature (1~\:) increases (see Figure 11) , because of the increased time 11eeue<l to traverse the bend tor larger values of Re: fhis effect, for Re in the range considered, is larger than the opposing effect of a decreasing centrifugal force as Rc increases.
3. An estimate of the error caused by assuming a constant radii of curvature for the particles may be obtained from further increases, S dec:rei1ses more rapidly until the effect starts to saturate at about 8 = 1T. Above 8 = 3tr /2, sufficient particles are sure to be deposited so that a further increase in the particle sink (i.e., a sharper bend) is not effective.
The leak-path roughness affects the source strength only if turbulent flow occurs. The 50llr('e strength may be affected by changes of e in two opposing w;iys. First, increases in e can decrease the flow velocity, necessitating more leak paths and hence increasing S, if the flow used to compute the number of leak paths is turbulent. Second, increases in e increase f so that for particles whose mass transfer coefficient is given by Equation 29, the nundeposition probability will be decreased. However, as the product tv/ remains constant when Vi is changed by. changing e, the turbulent nondeposition probability for particles, whose mass transfer coefficient is given by Equation 28, does not change as e varies. (Table VI Equation 30 for determining the appropriate mass-transfer coefficient recipe are unaffected by changes in e, so that as e is varied for a given particle distribution, the same particle fraction is affected by Equations 29 and 30 respectively. · The source-strength change as e is changed, given for six masses, is shown in Figure 12 . For the nominal 300-kg mass, the increase in Sat extreme e values over that at the nominal e values (see Table VI ) is only about a factor of 1.1. Ase increases, the flow may be forced to become laminar (as shown in Figure 12 ). Above this value of e, the source strength stays constant since changes in e only affect turbulent flow.
In Figures 13 and 14 range of leak-path radii considered is 10-2 to 10 3 cm.· Figure 13 shows the radii range in which laminar flow and the transition from laminar to turbulent flow occurs. For all masses, the flow is turbulent above a radius of 0.5 cm. 
RFP-1543
At large masses of oxidized plutonium, a considerable discontinuity in S appears.at the laminar-turbulent flow transition caused by high flow velocity at which the transition occurs. For smaller masses, the transition appears as a . bunching of the curves near a radius of 0.5 cm. Above 0.8 cm, the flow is fully turbulent for all masses. In Figure 14 , the fully turbulent flow-source strengths are plotted. For leak paths~ 2.6 cm in radius, it ·is seen that the enclosure can safely contain up to 5000 kg of rapidly oxidizing plutonium. Figures 13 and 14 may be used to compute the net source strengths associated with leakage through any combination of straight leak paths using the relation S = ~i NiSi. Figure 15 shows the volume leakage (airflow) percent per second of air from the test cell. It is seen that if this initial leakage rate could be sustained for 300-kg oxidation, the entire air content ofthe cell would escape in one second through a single 44-cm radius leak path. The source strength associated with a 44-cm radius leak path is 4 X 10 15 atoms per second.
CONCLUSIONS
The survey of observational data on plutonium releases indicates that fires or explosions involving plutonium being handled within enclosure do not give rise to dangerous free releases of a plutonium aerosol. The results of the calculational model substantiate this. The calculations indicate that free releases from the Rocky Flats Critical Mass Facility test cell for the nominal release variable set (see Table VII ) are safe by about 2% orders of magnitude. The model does, however, show (Table VII) that maximizing either the plutonium release rate or the enclosure thermal equilibrium type can cause a free release which exceeds the safe release rate (see Appendix C).
Operational criteria for small enclosures handling large quantities of fissle metal are thus to continuously exhaust the enclosure via a series of fireproof absolute filters. The airflow associated with the exhaust mode of operation must be sufficient to prevent static pressure build-up associated with the release, but low enough to avoid intensifying the release rate.
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APPENDIX C. The Maximum Safe Source Strength.
The maximum safe source strength is obtained from Equation 36 and the Table I 
